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NOTES
Injunctions
UNLICENSED PRACTIcE OF LICENSED TRADE, ART OR PROFESSION
Right of Licensed Practitioner to Enjoin Such Activity
Three decades ago the right of an individual licensed practi-
tioner to enjoin the unlicensed practice of his trade, art, or pro-
fession was a legal non-entity.' In fact, equity would not act
to prevent the unlicensed activity even when suit was brought
against the encroaching offender by state and public officials.2
It made no difference what theory the plaintiff pleaded, re-
fusal to give injunctive relief uniformly being based on the fact
that the licensing statute made unlicensed practice a criminal
offense, and thus provided adequate remedy at law.
The first rejection of the old concept occurred in 1931 when an
Ohio court granted injunctive relief to an attorney against the
illegal practice of law.3 The court reasoned that the members
of the legal profession have an interest in their practice amount-
ing to a property right in the nature of a franchise, which made
the attorney a proper party to bring action for the benefit of
the attorneys as a class. The existence of a penal statute pro-
hibiting the unauthorized practice of law did not provide an
adequate remedy so as to bar equitable relief.
As might be expected, there has been subsequent disagreement
as to whether the individual licensee has the right to restrain the
unlawful practice of his trade, art, or profession. Two recent
cases reaching opposite conclusions are illustrative of the current
conflict on this issue. The Supreme Court of Illinois decided in
Burden v. Hoover4 that licensed chiropractors had a property
right in their practice which would entitle them to secure
equitable relief against the unlicensed practice of chiropractic.
But in New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey
Mortgage Associatee the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
I Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Pub. Co., 118 Misc. 789, 195 N.Y. Supp. 37
(Sup. Ct. 1922) (certified public accountant); Merz v. Murchison, 30 Ohio
C.C.Dec. 646 (1908) (doctor); Drummond v. Rowe, 155 Va. 725, 156 S..
442 (1931) (veterinarian).
2 State v. Green, 122 Ind. 462, 14 N.E. 352 (1887) (doctor); State v.
Maltby, 108 Neb. 578, 188 N.W. 175 (1922) (chiropractor).
3 Dworken v. Apartment House Owners' Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176
N.E. 577 (1931).
4 9 11. 2d 143, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956).
5 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956).
1957]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
that while the bar association could enjoin the illegal practice
of law, the individual attorney had no right to bring such an
action. It is the purpose of this Note to explore where injunctive
relief has been sought and to evaluate the rationale of the courts
in either granting or denying relief.
The practitioner desiring injunctive relief must first establish
the inadequacy of available legal remedies. Usually this is not
difficult but in some instances injunctive relief has been denied
on the ground that the statutory remedy provided in the licensing
act afforded sufficient protection for the individual as well as the
state. A brief survey of the available legal remedies, however,
indicates their deficiencies. Damages would be highly speculative,
and there would be no assurance of future protection if damages
were recovered The unlicensed party can be denied recovery
for work unlawfully done7 but this affords no relief to the
licensed practitioner. Since the primary purpose of these suits
is to put an end to the unlawful practice, it seems apparent
that an injunction is the only satisfactory judicial remedy. Al-
though a regular criminal proceeding or a quo warranto action
might accomplish the desired result, the time required to secure
a favorable judgment makes both of these remedies less de-
sirable.
The mere fact that the unlicensed activity constitutes a crime
is not an absolute bar to equitable jurisdiction s As noted in
several recent cases, a court of equity, while.powerless to enjoin
a crime as such, has inherent power to enjoin acts causing ir-
reparable injury to property rights9 and acts equivalent to a
public nuisance'0 although these acts are also punishable as
crimes. This concept has best been demonstrated in suits by
the state or its agencies to enjoin unlicensed practices amounting
to public nuisances. States or their licensing boards have been
successful in enjoining the unlicensed operation of: an em-
ployment agency,"' a real estate brokerage,' 2 and a junk yard,'3
6 Arkansas State Board of Architects v. Clark, 291 S.W.2d 262 (Ark.
1956); People ex rel Shepardson v. Universal Chiropractors Ass'n, 302 M.
228, 134 N.E. 4 (1922) (overruled in part by Burden v. Hoover, see note 1
supra).
7 Rubin v. Douglas, 59 A.2d 690 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1948) (alowed
injured party to recover amount paid).
8 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); State ex rel Mathews v. Hines, 178
Kan. 142, 283 P.2d 472 (1955).
9 Smith v. Taylor, 289 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App. 1956).
10 Schur v. Santa Monica, 300 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1956).
3. State ex ret Weasmer v. Manpower of Omaha Inc, 161 Neb. 387, 73
N.W.2d 692 (1955).
12 Nevada Real Estate Comm'n v. Ressel, 294 P.2d 1115 (Nev. 1956).
13 Township of Garfield v. Young, 340 Mich. 616, 66 N.W.2d 85 (1954).
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as well as the unlawful practice of dentistry,' 4 naturopathy,' 5
medicine, 16 chiropractic,' 7 optometry,'8 and plumbing.' 9 How-
ever, in other cases, injunctive relief has been denied in actions
to enjoin unlicensed photography,20 unlicensed practice of archi-
tecture,21 barbering without a certificate of registration,2 2 and
the unlicensed practice of chiropractic.23 The rationale followed
when an injunction is granted is that the activity complained
of amounts to a public nuisance and the legal remedy does
not offer sufficient protection for the public interest.
Turning to the question of the individual's right to enjoin the
unlawful practice of a profession, the courts have followed three
basic theories in granting relief to the complaining practitioner.
By the first and most predominant theory, the license of the
practitioner is considered as a franchise or property right which
is entitled to equitable protection. The second theory treats the
illegal practice as a public nuisance and allows the licensee
relief upon showing his special injury. The third and least used
theory is that the unlicensed party is an unfair competitor from
whom the licensed practitioner is entitled to be protected.
The property right theory as presently accepted by many
courts, was expressly rejected by several earlier decisions. The
Indiana court refused to accept the franchise idea under any
circumstances: "It cannot be held . . . that the right of any
person to practice his or her profession, under a license issued
pursuant to a statute enacted by the legislature . . . comes
within any legal definition of a franchise. '24 In refusing equitable
relief it was reasoned that the licensing statute provided a penal
sanction which was considered to be an adequate remedy. Also,
'4 Boykin v. Atlanta-Southern Dental College, 177 Ga. 1, 169 S.E. 361
(1933); State ex tel Wolfley v. Oster, 75 Idaho 472, 274 P.2d 829 (1954);
Nugent v. Stokes, 313 Ky. 131, 230 S.W.2d 609 (1950); State v. Boren, 36
Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566, dismissed per curiam, 340 U.S. 881 (1950).
15 State ex rel. McCulloh v. Polhemus, 51 N.M. 282, 183 P.2d 153 (1947).
16 Dean v. State ex rel Board of Medical Registration and Examination,
233 Ind. 25, 116 N.E2d 503 (1954).
17 Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Mooring, 86 So.2d
641 (La. 1956); contra, People ex rel Shepardson v. Universal Chiropractors
Ass'n., supra, note 6.
1s Busch Jewelry Co. v. State Board of Optometry, 216 Miss. 475, 62
So.2d 770, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 830 (1953).
19 Martin v. Thompson, 253 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1952).
20 Montana State Board of Examiners in Photography v. Keller, 120
Mont. 364, 185 P.2d 503 (1947); Matthews v. Lawrence, 212 N.C. 537, 193
S.E. 730 (1937).
21 Arkansas Stalbe Board of Architects v. Clark, 291 S.W.2d 262 (Ark.
1956).
22 Richmond v. Miller, 70 N.D. 157, 292 N.W. 633 (1940).
23 State v. Maltby, 108 Neb. 578, 188 N.W. 175 (1922).
24 State v. Green, 122 Ind. 462, 14 N.E. 352, 357 (1887).
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since the licensing statute was enacted for the public welfare, any
benefit to a licensed practitioner was thought to be only in-
cidental. "The circle of competition may be narrowed by ex-
cluding unlicensed competitors, but that is not the purpose of
the law."25
This restrictive view was rejected in the leading case of
Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Assn,2 6 the first case
to grant injunctive relief on the application of an individual
licensed practitioner. An attorney's right to practice law was held
to be a property right similar to a franchise and entitled to equi-
table protection. Shortly thereafter a similar franchise property
right was recognized in granting injunctive relief to a licensed
physician despite the fact that the unauthorized activity amounted
to a public offense.27
Some courts have had difficulty accepting the franchise theory
because of the notion that a franchise must be exclusive to merit
equitable protection. In one of these cases it was admitted that
lawyers enjoy a franchise but it was held that a license to
practice chiropody was not a franchise.2 8 The court also referred
to the licensing statute involved, stating that it was not enacted
for the benefit of the licensees. To the contrary, however, it has
been implied that the only proper party to bring suit is the
individual practitioner, because he is the only party whose
property rights are being violated. Neither the state nor the as-
sociation has any property rights in the matter. Therefore, the
court concluded that only individual optometrists had full ca-
pacity to bring suit to enjoin the unlawful practice of optometry.29
Some courts have granted injunctive relief on the basis of the
franchise alone without definitely holding it to be a property
right.3 0 As stated in an Illinois case, ". . . an attorney is the
proper party to bring the suit, and ... an injunction is the proper
remedy for the unauthorized practice of law."3'
Other courts have not been so liberal in granting relief,
placing a strict interpretation on those licensing acts which
do not expressly allow anyone other than the public authorities-
to prosecute a violation. In an interesting discussion of this at-
titude, the New Hampshire Supreme Court pointed out that,
25 Merz v. Murchison, 20 Ohio C. C. Dec. 646, 648 (1908).
26 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931).
27 Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S.E. 800 (1933).
28 Mosig v. Jersey Chiropodists Inc., 122 N.J. Eq. 382, 194 Atl. 248 (Ch.
1937).
29 Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 (1938).
30 Depew v. Wichita Retail Credit Ass'n, 141 Kan. 481, 42 P.2d 214 (1935);
Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932).
31 Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance Co., 326 IMI. App. 654, 63 N.E.2d
264, 271 (1945).
[Vol. XXXII
NOTES
"The rights of the individual plaintiffs are to be ascertained first
by a construction of the statute, and secondly by equitable
principles."3 2 After examining the statute in order to discover
whether the licensees were given any new rights or any right to
freedom from competition by unlicensed persons, the court held
that the individual plaintiffs had no property rights and no right
to bring suit.
One of the more recent cases which refused to grant relief
approached the problem from a slightly different tack. While
acknowledging the older concept of franchise, the court set
forth its current view:
The more recent attitude here has been that admission to our
bar is a privilege granted in the interests of the public to those who
are morally fit and mentally qualified, solely for the purpose of
protecting the unwary and the ignorant from injury at the hands
of persons unskilled or unlearned in the law . . . .33
In holding that the individual attorneys had no standing to
maintain an action for injunctive relief, the court also referred
to the licensing statute enacted for the benefit of the public.
"[Tihe licensing of law practitioners is not designed to give rise
to a professional monopoly... ."34 A somewhat similar rationale
was followed in another recent case involving optometrists where
it was held that there was nothing in the licensing act which
could be'construed to give the individual licensed optometrist the
right to maintain an action, because the act was concerned pri-
marily with the public welfare.3 5 Adopting the same line of
reasoning, an Oklahoma court declared that the county attorney
was the only party qualified to bring suit to enforce the "healing
arts acts."36 Thus, it seems that the reasoning of the New Hamp-
shire court is gaining ascendence in several jurisdictions.
This trend is not universally accepted, however: a recent
Illinois decision 37 granted injunctive relief against the unlicensed
practice of chiropractors, stressing the importance of the plain-
tiff's property rights and noting, too, the benefit to the public
resulting from the injunction. The court made it clear that:
whether the right to practice the profession be called a
franchise, a license or a privilege, it is certainly a valuable in-
32 Board of Registration v. Scott Jewelry Co., 90 N.H. 368, 9 A.2d 513,
518 (1939).
3 New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage As-
sociates, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A2d 498, 504 (1956).
34 ibid., quoting from Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863,
864 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
35 Delaware Optometric Ass'n v. Sherwood, 122 A.2d 424 (Del. Ch. 1956),
aff'd, 128 A.2d 812 (Del. 1957).
36 Taylor v. State ex rel. Rutherford, 291 P.2d 1033 (Okla. 1955),
appeal dismissed, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3102 (Oct. 8, 1956) (No. 88).
37 Burden v. Hoover, 9 M. 2d 143, 137 N.E.2d 59 (1956).
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terest that should, in justice, be entitled to protection." a
To sum up, there is a definite conflict among the jurisdictions
as to the validity of the franchise rationale and the propriety of
granting injunctive relief to the aggrieved individual prac-
titioner. In view of the constant expansion of equity jurisdiction,
which now includes personal rights among the subjects meriting
injunctive protection, 9 there should be no objection to the
granting of relief to the licensee whether his license is con-
sidered a franchise, a property right, or a mere privilege. As
illustrated by the reasoning of the stricter jurisdictions, however,
it seems logical to look at the statute40 conferring or qualifying
the right to practice the art or profession in question, in order
to ascertain its beieficial object and consequent location of the
power of enforcement.
The second theory followed by the courts in granting in-
junctive relief considers the unlicensed activity as a public
nuisance and permits the licensee to obtain an injunction upon
showing special injuries. It is obvious that the plaintiff pro-
ceeding under this theory has a more difficult case to prove be-
cause mere violation of a statute is not always nuisance per se.
In addition, it sometimes is difficult to prove special injuries in
a case of this nature.
Usually the unlicensed practice of the healing arts is found
to be a public nuisance because of the possible danger to the
public health and welfare if untrained and unskillful persons
are permitted to engage in such practice.4 ' Several courts, how-
ever, have refused to enjoin the lawful practice of the healing
arts if no actual peril is shown.42 Some decisions have held that
since the statute was enacted for the public benefit, the indi-
vidual practitioner has no special rights and must prove his
special damages just as an ordinary plaintiff must in order to
secure injunctive relief. Outside of the healing arts, unlicensed
activity usually does not amount to "a public nuisance. Public
officials and professional associations have been refused relief in
their attempts to enjoin the unlicensed practice of architecture,4 3
38 Id. at 62.
39 Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
40 A few states have passed statutes which provide that a person who
violates the law requiring a license for practice of his profession can be
restrained by permanent injunction. The statutes generally specify the
proper parties to bring such an action, ARz. CODE AwNi. § 67-1107 (e) (Supp.
1952); IOWA CODE § 147.83 (1954), held valid in State v. Fray, 214 Iowa 53,
241 N.W. 663 (1932); ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.040 (1953).
41 People ex rel. Bennett v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E.2d 439, 444
(1938).
42 E.g., Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921).
43 Arkansas State Board of Architects v. Clark, 291 S.W.2d 262 (Ark.
1956).
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photography,44 chiropractic,4 barbering,46 and veterinary.47
The usual policy of the courts in these cases is to consider both
the importance of complainant's property right and the harmful
effect of the unlawful activity on the public rather than to
decide on one factor alone. Actually the inexact terminology
often used by the courts makes it difficult to determine whether
a particular decision is based on the franchise or the nuisance
theory or a combination of the two.
The third rationale suggested by the courts is that a licensed
practitioner has an interest in his practice which should be pro-
tected from unfair competition by unlicensed practitioners. Al-
though this theory is seldom utilized, it appears to be valid
when viewed in the light of other unfair competition4 8 cases. Its
infrequency probably is due to the fact that the courts which
recognize the property right theory in effect protect the licensee
from unfair competition when they enjoin the unlicensed activity.
Undoubtedly the courts believe that it is unnecessary to go
any further than recognizing the property right when that alone
furnishes a sufficient basis for injunctive relief.
In granting an injunction to licensed optometrists, a Michigan
court stated the unfair competition theory concisely:
Suit may be brought by parties engaged in a profession or business
to enjoin unfair trade and practice which would be injurious to
their interests, and the fact that such practices are punishable
by criminal penalties is inmaterialA9
An attorney was refused relief in another case because he failed
to allege any unlawful competition.50 It seems that this theory
is more reasonable than the property right theory, for it requires
proof of adverse effects on the licensee before relief is granted
rather than basing recovery on the mere fact of a technical in-
fringement such as was done in several property right cases.
After noting the various cases granting injunctive relief
against the unauthorized practice of the professions, trades, and
arts it is clear that this form of equitable relief is highly de-
sirable for many reasons. It prohibits the unlawful activity
immediately and permanently, in some instances even before
44 Montana State Board of Examiners v. Keller, 120 Mont. 364, 185 P.2d
503 (1947).
45 People ex 7el. Shepardson v. Universal Chiropractors' Ass'n, 302 Mii.
228, 134 N.E. 4 (1922).
46 Richmond v. Miller, 70 NfD. 157, 292 N.W. 633 (1940).
47 Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. Glisan, 230 S.W.2d 169 (Mo.
1950).
48 See e.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490
(WiD. Pa. 1938).
49 Seifert v. Buhl Optical Co., 276 Mich. 692, 268 N.W. 784, 787 (1936).
50 Steinberg v. McKay, 295 Mass. 139, 3 N.E.2d 23 (1936).
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the offense has actually been committed. The rapidity with which
a violater of an injunction can be punished acts as an extremely
effective deterrent to continued unlawful activity. Since in
many cases there is no punishment if the restraining order is
obeyed, equity puts the offender in a better position than a
criminal proceeding which carries with it the penalty of fine
or imprisonment. A criminal action is not barred by the equity
proceedings, but normally no criminal prosecution follows if the
offender ceases his unlawful practice.
The most potable disadvantage of granting equitable relief is
the denial of a jury trial for the offender, not only at the time the
injunction is granted, but also during any prosecution for viola-
tion of the injunction. Another fault is present if a civil rather
than a criminal contempt proceeding is instituted: the special
immunities and evidence requirements of a criminal trial are by-
passed.
These advantages and disadvantages are equally applicable to
actions brought by individuals, associations, or governmental
agencies. One manifest danger in permitting individuals to
enjoin unlicensed practice is that the defendant may be sub-
jected to unwarranted harassment by a litigant motivated by
purely personal reasons.
As pointed out in some decisions, allowing the individual the
right to enjoin violations of the licensing act endows him with
a quasi-monopoly. Oftentimes the injury complained of is slight
or nonexistent and there has been no harm to the community,
but the licensee is permitted to enjoy an exclusive competitive
position. Of course, in a large number of cases the public has
benefited from the injunction granted to an individual because
the unlawful activity was actually harmful. Moreover, an
individual practitioner is more likely to know about any un-
authorized practice because it affects him more directly than it
affects the public officials.
A possible solution to the conflict of interests inherent in this
problem would be to permit the individual practitioner to file a
complaint with the board of licensors for their consideration. Then
the board could hold an informal hearing to determine whether
the matter merited taking legal action. If the board decided there
was sufficient evidence of a violation, it would bring the action
itself, wth a greater possibility of success than the individual
would have because there would be no need to prove special
injuries. On the other hand if the board decided against any
action, the individual practitioner should not be permitted
to bring suit unless it can be shown that the board was lax
and negligent in performing its duties or that the board acted
arbitrarily in refusing to consider the complaint.
Ray F. DrexIer
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